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ABSTRACT 
Under the Higher Education Contribution Scheme, graduates face a sharp discontinuity in 
their  taxable  income.  At  the  first  repayment  threshold,  they  are  required  to  pay  a 
percentage of their entire income to reduce their debt. This results in an extremely high 
effective marginal tax rate. Using a sample of taxpayer returns, we investigate whether 
taxpayers bunch below the repayment threshold. We find a statistically significant degree 
of bunching below the threshold, but the effect is economically small. The result has 
important implications for the design of income-contingent university loans schemes. 
 
JEL Classification: H31, H52  
 





In many developed countries, the taxation system is increasingly being used for purposes 
that were not envisaged a generation ago. Earned income tax credits, education credits 
and child credits are among the programs that have been introduced or expanded in many 
developed countries over recent years. In some nations, the taxation system has also been 




While the taxation system can be an efficient way of means-testing various benefits and 
payments, using it in this way may create high effective marginal tax rates at certain 
points in the income structure. In this paper we address the question: to what extent do 
significant discontinuities in the tax schedule affect taxpayers’ behaviour through their 
effect on disposable incomes?  
 
To this end, we are fortunate to have at our disposal possibly the largest policy-induced 
discontinuity of this kind ever experienced in any country – the repayment threshold 
associated with the collection of Australia’s income-contingent charge for higher 
education tuition, known as the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS). In the 
most recent year covered by our study, the disposable income of a person earning 
precisely the repayment threshold amount would be $760 lower than that of a person 
earning $1 per annum less than this repayment threshold, but the discontinuity is much 
lower since the debt will typically still be repaid. On one set of assumptions, including 
that the individual expects to pay off his or her debt in six years, the present value of 
                                                       
1 A system to collect child support payments from non-custodial parents through the 
taxation system was introduced in Australia in 1987. Countries that use the tax system to 
recover higher education student loans include Australia (1989), New Zealand (1991), 
Ethiopia (2002), Thailand (2006) and the United Kingdom (introduced in 1997 for 
income support and expanded considerably in 2005 to also cover tuition). The 
governments of Colombia, Israel and other countries are seriously considering using their 
taxation systems to collect student loans in the near future.  
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deferring repayment by keeping one’s income below the threshold is around $200 (see 
Appendix I for details).
2 
 
Relatively little research has focused on the impact of sharp discontinuities in the taxation 
schedule on behaviour. Most relevant to our analysis is the work of Saez (2008) which 
explores whether taxpayers bunch just below ‘kink points’ in the US tax schedule. Using 
microdata from US tax returns over the period 1960-97, Saez finds evidence of bunching 
at the first tax bracket, which for much of the period of the study represents an increase in 
the effective marginal tax rate from zero to 15 percent. He finds little evidence of 
bunching at other tax brackets, or around the Earned Income Tax Credit’s various kink 
points. Other US studies find modest evidence of bunching. For example, Burtless and 
Moffitt (1984) and Friedberg (1998, 2000) find some bunching for elderly US workers 
who are working and receiving social security benefits; while Blundell (2002) and 
Blundell and Hoynes (2004) find some bunching just above the first eligibility threshold 
for the UK earned income tax credit.
3  
 
Our paper focuses on a kink point that is many orders of magnitude higher than any 
covered in previous studies. Using a sample of tax returns from young workers, we 
compare the distribution of taxpayers affected by the kink point (that is, with a HECS 
debt) with those not affected by the kink point (that is, without a HECS debt). To preview 
our findings, we observe a small but significant degree of bunching at the repayment 
threshold, but the budgetary cost and the lost pre-tax earnings resulting from this 
substantial discontinuity in the taxation schedule appear to be relatively small. We 
                                                       
2 The assumption of a six-year repayment period is based on estimates from Chapman 
(2006). 
3 In the Australian context the only other relevant study is Braithwaite and Ahmed 
(2005), who survey a sample of graduates concerning their attitudes to HECS and the 
taxation system. They find a positive correlation between an 8-item scale of attitudes 
towards HECS repayment and another 8-item scale of attitudes towards paying one’s 
income tax. From this they conclude that the introduction of HECS has the potential to 
undermine confidence in the taxation system. If this conclusion is true, then an 
implication is that we should observe bunching below the HECS repayment threshold.   
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conclude that even an extremely high effective marginal tax rate seems to have a 
surprisingly small impact on behaviour. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II outlines the HECS system 
focusing on the nature and importance of the repayment threshold, and provides a 
conceptual discussion of some of the behavioural issues pertinent to calculations of 
effective marginal tax rates in the HECS context. In Section III we describe the data, 
explain our method for determining the extent of bunching, present the econometric 
results and offer some robustness checks. In Section IV we examine the policy 
implications of the results, with respect to both budgetary impacts and lower pre-tax 
earnings. The final section concludes with a discussion of the relevance of our findings 
for the design of income-contingent loan schemes and the general relevance of very high 
effective marginal tax rates for government budgets and labour supply behaviour.  
 
II. The Higher Education Contribution Scheme and Effective Marginal Tax Rates  
 
(i) Some Conceptual Issues Concerning Calculations of Effective Marginal Tax Rates 
 
A major advantage of our exercise is that we are able to empirically explore the effects of 
an extraordinary high effective marginal tax rate, which is that associated with the 
repayment of Australia’s income-contingent charge for higher education. However, there 
is a potentially significant difference in this context between the repayment of an income-
contingent loan and the payment of taxes (or receipt of benefits). In this section we 
discuss the structure of HECS and the way one might calculate effective marginal tax 
rates in relation to a loan payment.  Our analysis indicates that even when one takes 
account of the fact that loans still have to be repaid, the HECS discontinuity imposes 
extremely high, indeed unprecedented, costs for taxpayers from earning small amounts 
above a particular income level. This suggests that there are important broad lessons to be 
learned from testing the impact of HECS on bunching behaviour. 
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(ii) HECS Described  
 
In 1989 the Australian government introduced the world’s first income-contingent charge 
system using the taxation system as the collection mechanism. A detailed description of 
HECS may be found in Chapman (2006). For present purposes, it is sufficient to sketch 
the main features of the system. Upon enrolment, a higher education student faces the 
choice of paying the year’s tuition charge up-front and receiving a 20 percent discount, or 
contracting to pay later through the income tax system with repayments depending on the 
annual level of the debtor’s personal income. The nominal value of the stock of an 
individual’s debt is indexed to the Consumer Price Index, meaning that the real rate of 
interest on HECS debt, once it is incurred, is set at zero.  
 
No repayments are required until the former student receives a minimum annual income, 
which in the period that we study was set at around $25,000. To ensure that the loan is 
repaid relatively quickly, the system is designed such that a taxpayer whose earnings 
exceed the income threshold for repayment, is required to pay a percentage of his or her 
entire taxable income, not merely a percentage of the amount exceeding the threshold.
4 In 
2003-04 (the most recent year covered in our study) a taxpayer with a HECS debt who 
earned over $25,348 was required to pay 3 percent of total taxable income towards 
repayment of the debt. This means that the disposable income of a person earning the 
threshold level of income would be $760 lower per annum than that of a person earning 
$1 per annum under this repayment threshold.
5  
                                                       
4 There is a slight difference between general taxable income and the taxable income 
definition used for HECS purposes (which the ATO terms ‘repayment income’). 
Repayment income is equal to taxable income plus claimed deductions for reportable 
fringe benefits and net rental losses. For the workers in our empirical analysis (aged 21-
30), we assume that these amounts are trivial, and therefore do not take them into 
account. It is unlikely that this assumption biases our results, since the ATO has merely 
removed two categories that taxpayers might have exploited to bring their taxable income 
below the threshold. 
5 The HECS system has several repayment rates, and the points at which they increase are 
often termed ‘repayment thresholds’. For simplicity, throughout our paper we use the 
term ‘repayment threshold’ to refer to the first repayment threshold. (The other thresholds  
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To illustrate these relationships, Figure 1 shows the effect of the repayment threshold for 
two taxpayers – one with a HECS debt, and one without. Over the range of the HECS 
threshold, a taxpayer without a HECS debt is subject to the marginal rate of income tax, 
which is 30 percent at the threshold.
6 B y  c o n t r a s t ,  a  t a x p a y e r  w i t h  a  H E C S  d e b t  
experiences an actual decrease in disposable income at the repayment point, which is 
both very large and covers a substantial range. For example, in 2003-04 a taxpayer with a 
HECS debt must earn an additional $1135 in order to have the same disposable income as 
individuals earning just below the repayment threshold. This means that in 2003-04, a 
taxpayer with a HECS debt had the same current disposable income at $25,347 per 
annum as if she earned $26,482 per annum. 
 
Using the traditional (and in this case, incorrect) calculation of the impact of earning an 
additional dollar on disposable income at the threshold implies an effective marginal tax 
rate of 76,000 percent, an extraordinarily large figure for public policy analysis and 
debate in this area. To put this in context, the highest marginal personal income tax rate 
among OECD countries is 70 percent, while the maximum effective marginal tax rate due 




generate smaller discontinuities than the first threshold, and we find no evidence that 
taxpayers with HECS debts bunch at those points.) 
6 For simplicity, we ignore in this example the Medicare levy, which depends on the 
income of the taxpayer’s spouse and the number of dependent children. For a single 
taxpayer with no dependent children, the Medicare levy would raise the marginal tax rate 
by 1.5 percent in the income range discussed in the example. The Medicare levy does not 
interact with HECS repayment provisions. 
7 Top tax rates are for 2004, from the OECD Tax Database, Table I.4 (www.oecd.org). 
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Figure 1: The HECS Repayment Threshold, 2003-04
 
 
(iii) Understanding HECS Effective Marginal Tax Rates: Loans Still Have to be 
Repaid  
 
In contradistinction to the above, there is a different way of interpreting effective 
marginal tax rates in the context of HECS, for several reasons. A major issue is that the 
avoidance of a loan repayment in a particular period would generally mean that there is 
only a deferral of the obligation, not a one-off benefit. After all, for most debtors the total 
loan still has to be repaid in the future.
8  
 
It is instructive to estimate the value of deferring the repayment of an income-contingent 
loan, so that we may compare with the value of avoiding the payment of income taxes. In 
Appendix I, we present an illustrative numerical simulation, suggesting that for one 
plausible set of parameters, the net present value of keeping one’s income below the 
threshold for one year is $193. While this is considerably smaller than the $760 that 
                                                       
8 Harding (1995) has estimated that around 80 percent of HECS debtors will pay back in 
full, and about half of the remaining 20 percent will repay at least half of their debt.  
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would hold if the threshold was a tax rate rather than a loan repayment rate, it nonetheless 
suggests that a taxpayer who is close to the threshold will gain a non-trivial amount from 
‘bunching’. 
 
In Appendix II, we also formally model the benefits and costs of repayment. The benefits 
take the form of deferring the repayment of a debt that is indexed to inflation, but does 
not accrue interest. The costs take the form of the debtor (taxpayer) needing to find a 
mechanism or mechanisms to reduce taxable income below the threshold once it is 
expected that income would reach the threshold. There are several ways in which this 
might be done. The taxpayer might reduce his or her labour supply, hire an accountant to 
find additional deductions or purchase deductible items.  
 
Our model suggests that avoidance is more likely the higher is the repayment rate, the 
higher is the taxpayer’s individual discount rate, the higher is the number of years it takes 
for the postponed debt to be paid, the lower is the per-dollar avoidance cost, the higher is 
the repayment threshold and (in most cases) the higher is the taxpayer’s income before 
avoidance is attempted. Although we cannot observe all of these parameters in our 
empirical analysis, it is useful to bear them in mind nonetheless. 
 
III. Empirical Findings: How Much Bunching Is There? 
 
(i) The Data 
 
In order to focus precisely on behaviour around the repayment threshold, it is necessary 
for us to use data that identify an individual’s taxable income (total income minus 
deductions). For this reason, administrative data are preferable to survey data, since they 
allow us to pinpoint taxpayers who are very close to the threshold. We therefore obtained 
a representative sample of confidentialised tax returns from the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO). At the time of writing, the ATO did not make a standard sample of tax 
returns available to researchers (although such a sample has since been created). Our data 
were therefore extracted specifically for this project by the ATO.   
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The tax year in Australia runs from 1 July to 30 June, and all taxpayers file as single 
individuals. Our extract consists of 5000 taxpayers in each of the three tax years 2001-02, 
2002-03 and 2003-04, and respondents are aged between 21 and 30, the age range in 
which we expected to find a high proportion of HECS debtors. Half of the respondents 
(2500 in each year) have an outstanding HECS debt, while half do not. Our total potential 
sample comprises 15,000 taxpayers (though because we focus on those close to the 
repayment threshold, we will only use several hundred taxpayers in our regressions). The 
data extract contains information on total taxable income, whether or not the person has 
an outstanding HECS debt (and the size of that debt), age, sex and marital status.  
 
This information allows us to construct what we call a ‘treatment group’ (taxpayers with 
a HECS debt) and a ‘control group’ (taxpayers without a HECS debt). Members of these 
groups are not completely distinct with respect to ever having had HECS obligations, 
since a proportion of those in the control group may have gained a university degree and 
paid their tuition up-front, while others might have graduated with a HECS debt which 
has been fully repaid.  
 
Crucial to our analysis is the HECS repayment threshold. This is the point at which 
taxpayers with a HECS debt become liable to repay 3 percent of their total earnings (not 
merely 3 percent of their earnings above the threshold), hence creating a sharp 
discontinuity. This threshold is $23,242 in 2001-02, $24,365 in 2002-03, and $25,348 in 
2003-04. In each of these years, the marginal income tax rate at the repayment threshold 
point (that is, the marginal tax rate paid by the control group) is 30 percent. 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the two groups. In Panel A, we show summary 
statistics for the full sample of 15,000 taxpayers, while in Panel B, we show summary 
statistics only for those within $1000 of the repayment threshold. In Panel A, members of 
the treatment group tend to have lower earnings than the control group. In both Panels A 
and B, members of the treatment group are more likely to be female and are less likely to  
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be married. Note that for our purposes, it does not matter that the two groups are exactly 
the same – merely that there are enough data points around the kink.  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Control  Group Treatment  Group 
 Mean SD Mean  SD
Panel A: All taxpayers in extract 
Taxable Income ($)  25743.39 17942.79 20239.42  25890.35
HECS Debt ($)  0 0 11578.91  7472.81
Age (years)  25.82 2.87 25.20  2.65
Female 0.44 0.49 0.59  0.49
Married 0.21 0.41 0.13  0.34
Panel B: Taxpayers within $1000 of repayment threshold 
Taxable Income ($)  24228.72 1054.91 24301.86  1043.66
HECS Debt ($)  0 0 11207.54  6752.43
Age (years)  25.59 2.74 25.97  2.29
Female 0.42 0.49 0.60  0.49
Married 0.17 0.38 0.10  0.31
Note: In Panel A, the number of observations is 7500 for the control group, and 7500 for the treatment 
group. In Panel B, the number of observations is 348 for the control group, and 315 for the treatment group.  
 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the two groups in the range of $1000 below to $1000 
above the HECS repayment threshold. Although we do not observe substantial bunching, 
there are noticeable differences between the three panels on the left (control group) and 
the three panels on the right (treatment group). While those in the control group are 
evenly distributed over the range, those in the treatment group are discernibly bunched 




9 In the bottom left panel of Figure 2 (2003-04 tax year, No HECS debt), there is an apparent 
drop in the number of observations in the region $25,248-25,348 (ie. just below the HECS 
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(ii) The Method 
 
To formally test for bunching, we pool taxpayers from the three years, and compare the 
proportion of taxpayers on either side of the repayment threshold for the treatment group 
and the control group. Where Below Thresholdijt is an indicator variable denoting whether 
individual i in group j in year t is above or below the taxable threshold for that year, 
HECS Debtijt is an indicator variable denoting whether the individual has an outstanding 
HECS debt, Z is a vector of individual characteristics (sex, marital status and age), and δ 
are indicator variables for the different tax years used in this study, we estimate the 






ijt + γZijt + δt + εijt     ( 1 )  
 
In each case the sample is restricted to a given ‘window’ around the HECS repayment 
threshold. In successive specifications, we expand this window from $200 to $1000.
10 
                                                       
10 If taxpayers could precisely control their earnings, then all bunchers would have 
incomes $1 below the repayment threshold. However, to take account of the fact that  
  11
 
Our approach relies on the assumption that, in the absence of HECS, young adults with a 
HECS debt would have the same distribution around the repayment threshold as young 
adults without a HECS debt. By including demographic and time controls, we aim to take 
account of additional factors that might affect the shape of the earnings distribution 
around the repayment threshold.  
 
This strategy allows us to discern the extent of bunching. If taxpayers in the treatment 
group do not attempt to reduce their taxable income so that they are below the repayment 
threshold, we should expect the distribution for the treatment and control groups to be 





Table 2 shows the results from this exercise. Panel A is shown without any demographic 
or time controls – and is akin to a comparison of the means for the dependent variable in 
the two groups. Panel B then includes a full set of controls: gender, marital status, 
interactions between gender and marital status, an indicator for age and an indicator for 




taxable incomes may be ‘lumpy’, we define the ‘below threshold’ distance as being at 
least $200, and expand it symmetrically with the ‘above threshold’ distance. Another 
approach would be to fix the distance below the threshold, and only vary the distance 




Table 2: Formal Tests for Bunching 
Dependent variable: Indicator for taxable income being under the HECS repayment 
threshold 




±$200 ±$400 ±$600 ±$800  ±$1000 
Panel A: Without controls 
HECS  Debt 0.187** 0.212***  0.139*** 0.095**  0.053 
  [0.087] [0.060] [0.049] [0.043] [0.039] 
Observations  126 253 395 517 663 
Pseudo R
2 0.026 0.034 0.015 0.007 0.002 
Observed 
Probability  0.571 0.589 0.590 0.578 0.560 
Panel B: With controls 
HECS  Debt 0.206** 0.251***  0.140*** 0.094**  0.046 
  [0.096] [0.065] [0.052] [0.046] [0.041] 
Female 0.043  0.089  0.07  0.106**  0.087** 
  [0.101] [0.071] [0.055] [0.048] [0.043] 
Married -0.08  -0.145  -0.086  0.008  0.021 
  [0.279] [0.185] [0.126] [0.110] [0.090] 
Female× 
Married 0.110  0.055  0.177  0.09  0.003 
  [0.319] [0.214] [0.129] [0.129] [0.116] 
Indicator for 
age?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indicator for 
tax  year?  Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  126 253 395 517 663 
Pseudo R
2 0.105 0.096 0.044 0.033 0.021 
Observed 
Probability  0.571 0.589 0.590 0.578 0.560 
Notes:  
Distance from threshold is |Incomeijt-Thresholdt|.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Coefficients are marginal probabilities from a probit model, with robust standard errors in brackets.  
 
 
We observe statistically significant bunching behaviour by the treatment group, as 
compared with the control group. This is greatest within $400 of the threshold, where we 
observe bunching behaviour by 18-25 percent of the treatment group. When the window 
is expanded to ±$600, this effect attenuates, with 14 percent of the treatment group 
bunching. Expanding the window to ±$800, we observe only 9 percent of taxpayers  
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bunching. Finally, when the window is expanded to ±$1000, we do not observe any 
statistically significant bunching behaviour. Reassuringly, the results are similar both 
with and without the demographic and time controls. 
 
Overall, these results suggest that within $800 of the repayment threshold, around 9 
percent of those with a HECS debt are adjusting their income so as to bring themselves 
below the threshold. Of the 7500 taxpayers in our sample who have a HECS debt, 245 
individuals (or 3.2 percent) have taxable income that is within $800 of the HECS 
repayment threshold. These data taken together imply that 0.3 percent of all HECS 
debtors ‘bunch’ in a given year. If we assume that bunching involves moving one’s 
income from the midpoint of the upper range (+$400) to just below the repayment 
threshold, then the average person who bunches reduces his or her income by $400. 
 
What explains the relatively small degree of bunching that we observe in our data 
(around 1 in 300 HECS debtors per year)? In our view, the factor that is most important is 
that very few HECS debtors have incomes that are close enough to the repayment 
threshold to make avoidance worthwhile. Further, it may be that HECS debtors are 
uncertain about their incomes during the year, and are therefore not able to precisely 
manipulate their incomes to fall below the threshold. Other taxpayers may be unaware of 
the repayment threshold, and it is also plausible that some avoidance techniques have a 
high ongoing cost. For example, a taxpayer in a full-time job would be unlikely to forego 
a $200 salary rise in order to stay below the threshold in a given year, if the effect was 
that he or she would also have a salary that was $200 lower the following year and even 
beyond. 
 
(iv) Robustness Checks 
 
In essence, our results are based upon comparing the earnings distribution for individuals 
with a HECS debt to those without a HECS debt, around the repayment point. However, 
since having a HECS debt requires attending university, our treatment group has both 
more education and less experience than our control group. Even within the narrow  
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window around the repayment threshold, it is possible that we will misinterpret these 
experience and earnings differences as evidence of bunching. 
 
In this section we present two robustness checks. First, since experience and education 
effects are likely to be stronger for younger workers, we split the sample into respondents 
aged 21-25 and respondents aged 26-30. Experience and education will still matter for the 
older group, but to a lesser extent than for the younger group. If we observe substantially 
less bunching in the older sample, we might worry that our results are driven by 
experience and education, rather than by the repayment threshold. 
 
Table 3 shows the results of these specifications. Although statistical significance 
diminishes somewhat, we do not discern any substantial differences between the degree 
of bunching observed in younger and older workers. Within $400 of the threshold, those 
with a HECS debt are around 20 percent more likely to be below the threshold, with the 






Table 3: Formal Tests for Bunching – Splitting the Sample by Age 
Dependent variable: Indicator for taxable income being under the HECS repayment 
threshold 




±$200 ±$400 ±$600 ±$800  ±$1000 
Panel A: Aged 21-25 
HECS  Debt  0.212*  0.258***  0.116 0.115* 0.077 
  [0.125] [0.086] [0.076] [0.068] [0.061] 
Controls? Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  63  127 189 241 305 
Pseudo R
2 0.053 0.102 0.041 0.029 0.016 
Observed 
Probability 0.619 0.638 0.603 0.589 0.577 
Panel B: Aged 26-30 
HECS Debt  0.15  0.230**  0.163**  0.078  0.025 
  [0.141] [0.094] [0.073] [0.063] [0.055] 
Controls? Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  61  126 206 276 358 
Pseudo R
2 0.194 0.100 0.065 0.044  0.03 
Observed 
Probability 0.525 0.540 0.578 0.569 0.545 
Notes:  
Distance from threshold is |Incomeijt-Thresholdt|.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Coefficients are marginal probabilities from a probit model, with robust standard errors in brackets.  
All specifications include the same controls as in Panel B of Table 2: female, married, female×married, an 
indicator for age and an indicator for survey year. 
 
However, one might still wish to take account of the overall shape of the earnings density 
function in the general vicinity of the repayment threshold. For example, if the earnings 
density function of the treatment group was downward-sloping, while the earnings 
density function of the control group was upward-sloping, we might mistakenly assume 
that HECS debtors were bunching below the threshold. 
 
To see why this problem might matter in practice, Figure 3 shows a kernel density 
function for the overall distribution of earnings for the control group (no HECS debt) and 
the treatment group (HECS debt) for the most recent year in our data. Whereas Figure 2 
showed the density function only over the range from $1000 below to $1000 above the 
repayment threshold, Figure 3 shows the density function from $0 to $40,000. As can be  
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seen, the earnings density function of the treatment group is more left-skewed than the 
density function for the control group. Throughout the range $10,000 to $30,000, the 
density function of the control group is approximately uniform, while the density 
function of the treatment group is downward-sloping. (Similar patterns can be observed 
in tax years 2001-02 and 2002-03.)  
 
 
0 10000 20000 30000 40000
Control Group (No HECS Debt)
Treatment Group (HECS Debt)
Black line is repayment threshold. Gray lines denote area analysed in Tables 2 and 3.
Figure 3: Kernel Density Plot of Taxable
Income Distribution from $0-40,000 (2003-04)
 
 
A cautious reader might therefore worry that what we have termed ‘bunching’ may be no 
more than an artefact of overall differences in the two density functions. In practice, we 
regard this as unlikely, since our main estimates in Table 2 attenuate as we move further 
from the tax repayment threshold. If our results had been driven primarily by the slope of 
the earnings density function, and not by the HECS repayment threshold, we would not 
expect them to change as we moved further away from the threshold.  
 
However, in order to take account of the possibility that our results are affected by the 
slope of the earnings density function, we perform a final robustness check. Here, we 
create a variable which denotes the predicted gradient of the income distribution in the 
range around the repayment threshold. We do this in two ways: first, by using the ratio of  
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the number of taxpayers who are $2500-1500 below the threshold to the ratio of 
taxpayers that are between $1500-2500 above the threshold; and second, by fitting a 
quadratic to the entire density function from $0 to $40,000.  
 
By creating the ‘predicted gradient’ variable, we are able to take account of the general 
shape of the earnings distribution in the vicinity of the repayment threshold, and then test 
whether – holding this constant – the earnings distribution of HECS debtors is atypical 
when we focus in the region within $1000 of the repayment threshold. Such an empirical 
strategy is similar to regression discontinuity, since it is identified from the sharp break at 
the repayment threshold. Note that the first approach assumes that taxpayers who are 
more than $1500 above or below the repayment threshold do not bunch. To the extent 
that such bunching behaviour occurs above or below $1500, it will attenuate our 
estimates towards zero.  
 
Where θjt is the predicted gradient of the income distribution for individuals in group j in 






ijt + γZijt + δt + θjt + εijt    (2) 
 
 
Table 4 shows the results of these specifications. Our results are no longer statistically 
significant at conventional levels, and in two of the ten specifications the effect of the 
HECS debt is negative rather than positive. However, the majority of the estimated 
coefficients remain similar in magnitude to those in previous tables, suggesting that our 
results are unlikely to be driven by differences in the earnings distributions of the 




Table 4: Formal Tests for Bunching – Controlling for Earnings Distribution 
Dependent variable: Indicator for taxable income being under the HECS repayment 
threshold 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Distance from threshold  ±$200  ±$400  ±$600  ±$800  ±$1000 
Panel A: Prediction using gradient in nearby region 
HECS Debt  0.343  0.220  0.331  -0.031  0.265 
  [0.764]  [0.569]  [0.405]  [0.387]  [0.320] 
Predicted gradient  -0.222  0.050  -0.303  0.190  -0.339 
 [1.277]  [0.904]  [0.666]  [0.578]  [0.511] 
Controls?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  126 253 395 517 663 
Pseudo R
2  0.105 0.096 0.045 0.034 0.021 
Observed  Probability  0.571  0.589 0.59 0.578 0.56 
Panel B: Prediction using entire earnings distribution 
HECS Debt  0.197  0.293  0.074  0.140  -0.033 
  [0.292]  [0.202]  [0.158]  [0.136]  [0.124] 
Predicted  gradient    0.034 -0.167 0.248 -0.170 0.286 
 [1.063]  [0.752]  [0.559]  [0.483]  [0.426] 
Controls?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  126 253 395 517 663 
Pseudo R
2  0.105 0.096 0.045 0.034 0.021 
Observed  Probability  0.571  0.589 0.59 0.578 0.56 
Notes:  
Distance from threshold is |Incomeijt-Thresholdt|.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Coefficients are marginal probabilities from a probit model, with robust standard errors in brackets.  
All specifications include the same controls as in Panel B of Table 2: female, married, female×married, an 
indicator for age and an indicator for survey year. 
 
 
IV. The Significance of the Results for Policy 
 
(i) Estimating the Costs to the Budget 
 
A natural exercise at this point is to estimate the cost of this distortion to the budget. As a 
policy modelling exercise, one would preferably wish to compare the present manner in 
which HECS operates with some alternative policy. However, given the complexities 
involved in estimating the effects of this aspect of HECS, we begin by simply focusing 
on the effect of the repayment threshold on government revenues. Readers should note  
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that this budgetary cost must necessarily be compared with the costs of alternative 
schedules, which are unlikely to be zero. 
 
To estimate the budgetary costs of HECS, we use two findings from Section III: 
 
a)  within $800 of the repayment threshold, 9 percent of those with a HECS debt 
adjust their income so as to bring themselves below the threshold; and 
 
b)  of the 7500 taxpayers in our sample who have a HECS debt, 245 individuals (or 
3.2 percent) have taxable income that is within $800 of the HECS repayment 
threshold. 
 
Combining (a) and (b), we conclude that 0.3 percent of all HECS debtors ‘bunch’ in a 
given year. For simplicity, we refer to these individuals as ‘bunchers’. 
 
We also make the following three assumptions: 
 
c)  bunching involves moving one’s income from the midpoint of the upper range 
(+$400) to just below the repayment threshold – therefore the average person who 
bunches reduces his or her income by $400;  
 
d)  taxpayers only engage in bunching in their first year with a HECS debt; and 
 
e)  the average duration of HECS debtors is six years, and all taxpayers who bunch 
repay their debt in six years. 
 
Bunching therefore imposes two costs on the budget. First, since those who bunch reduce 
their taxable income by $400, the government loses the income tax that would have been 
paid on this income. Throughout the period covered by our study, the income tax rate 
around the HECS repayment threshold was 30 percent. Therefore the lost income tax per 
buncher is $120.  
  20
 
Second, bunching imposes a cost on the government because the taxpayer does not make 
a HECS repayment in that year. Instead, that HECS repayment is made in six years’ time. 
The size of the repayment is equal to 3 percent of the taxpayer’s pre-tax income before 
avoidance. If we assume that the income of the typical buncher is $400 above the 
repayment threshold, this amount is $709 in 2001-02, $743 in 2002-03 and $772 in 2003-
04. Recall that HECS debts are indexed to the CPI – hence the cost to the budget is the 
real interest that would have been earned on this amount over the period of six years, or 
the debt discounted at the social discount rate.  
 
The nominal cost to the budget is therefore the sum of the lost tax revenue and the 
deferral of the taxpayer’s HECS debt, multiplied by the number of people who bunch 
(see Appendix II for a more formal treatment). According to the ATO, in the most recent 
tax year, 644,107 people aged 21-30 had a HECS debt.
11 From assumptions (a) and (b), 
we estimate that 1932 people (0.3 percent of HECS debtors) bunch in a given year.  
 
What is the revenue cost from bunching in real terms? First, this depends on the lost tax 
revenue. Since the income tax rate in the vicinity of the repayment threshold is 30 
percent, and using the assumption that each buncher reduces her income by $400, the lost 
tax revenue per buncher is $120 (or $231,840 in total). Second, the lost tax revenue 
depends on the government’s real interest rate (or the real social discount rate), and the 
period taken to repay. Table 5 presents estimates of the total lost revenue from bunching, 
using two plausible real interest rates – 3 percent and 6 percent; and four possible delay 
periods – 6 years, 10 years, 20 years and infinity. Note that these estimates are for the 
total budgetary cost and include forgone tax revenue of $231,840. They are based on the 
assumption that the mean income of a person who bunches is $400 above the 2003-04 
repayment threshold, which was $25,348. 
 
                                                       
11 Note that although our most recent year of data is 2003-04, this figure is for the 2004-
05 tax year. The ATO was unable to supply us with the comparable figure for the last 
year of our data. However, the figure is likely to have been similar in 2003-04, and our 
results are not sensitive to reasonable perturbations.  
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Table 5: Estimating the Cost of Bunching to the Budget 
  Real government interest rate (or real social discount 
rate) 
Delay before repayment  3 percent 6 percent
6 years  $489,442 $699,504
10 years  $516,604 $931,824
20 years  $750,210 $1,322,692
Never repaid  $1,816,930 $1,816,930
Note: We assume 1932 people bunching below the repayment threshold. The average amount of bunching 
is assumed to be $400. Calculations are based on the 2003-04 repayment threshold ($25,348) and 
repayment rate (3 percent). All specifications include the same amount for the loss of income taxation 
($231,840), and differ only in their assessment of the budgetary cost of delayed repayment of the HECS 
liability. 
 
Assuming that the debts are eventually repaid, the lost revenue associated with bunching 
is estimated to be relatively small, in the order of half to one-and-a-half million dollars. 
Even in the unlikely event that bunching led to the debts never being repaid, the cost to 
the government is still only $1.8 million. To put this in perspective, the value of the 
HECS debt repaid in this manner in 2003-04 was $640 million (ATO 2004, 50).
12 Thus 
even our highest estimates suggest that the budgetary loss arising from the design of the 
HECS repayment threshold is less than 1/300th of the annual amount repaid under the 
scheme.  
 
(ii) Estimating the Impact on Pre-Tax Earnings  
 
Another relevant question to consider is the reduction in pre-tax earnings caused by this 
particular discontinuity in the HECS repayment schedule.
13 Note that in carrying out this 
exercise, we are not concerned with transfers between taxpayers and the government, but 
only the pre-tax earnings that are lost. While we do not have precise data on this point, 
we can place an upper bound on the lost earnings. Again, assume that 1932 people bunch, 
and that the average buncher reduces his or her pre-tax income by $400. In this scenario, 
                                                       
12 $640 million was the amount repaid in 2003-04 through what the ATO calls 
‘compulsory repayment’. The HECS scheme also allows for voluntary payments and up-
front payments. Including these, HECS payments in 2003-04 totalled $1,983 million 
(DEST 2005). 
13 Of course, other features of the HECS system will have an impact on pre-tax earnings. 
Our goal here is only to focus on one aspect: the sharp discontinuity in the repayment 
schedule.  
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the reduction in pre-tax earnings related to the sudden HECS repayment threshold is 
$772,800.  
 
Relative to the total earnings of recent university graduates, this is a small amount. 
Moreover, the true quantum of lost earnings may be less than this, since the figure of 
$772,800 assumes that the full reduction in taxable income takes place through a 
reduction in real earnings. However, it is also possible that at least part of the reduction in 
taxable income is more accurately regarded as a transfer from the government to the 
taxpayer than as a reduction in economic activity loss. For example, suppose that instead 
of reducing earnings, bunchers each purchased $400 of tax-deductible goods, which they 
valued at $200. In this instance, the amount of economic activity lost as a consequence of 
the HECS repayment threshold would be $386,400. 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
Income-contingent loans seem to be an effective way of addressing credit constraints for 
investment in human capital in Australia, and perhaps elsewhere. However, a critical 
issue in the design of such programs is the repayment structure. There are two practical 
ways of designing such systems: to set the repayment threshold at a low income level, but 
require repayment only to be on additional earnings above the threshold; or set the 
repayment threshold at a higher income level, but require repayment on a percentage of 
total earnings.  
 
While the latter approach has the virtue of requiring no repayments on low-income 
earners, some have suggested that such a sharp discontinuity might create large budgetary 
and earnings losses. Using a sample of taxpayers from Australia, we show that such 
concerns are unfounded. Close to the repayment threshold, we observe a degree of 
bunching by taxpayers that is statistically significant, but economically trivial. Overall, 
our calculations suggest that around 0.3 percent of all those with a HECS debt bunch 
below the repayment threshold. Plausible estimates of the loss to the budget and the  
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reduction in pre-tax earnings are below $1 million per year: a small amount relative to the 
size of the scheme and annual HECS repayments which are currently around $1.2 billion.  
 
The changes to the HECS collection parameters that took effect from 1 July 2004 are 
worthy of some attention. In terms of our exercise, the two important changes were: 
raising the first repayment threshold from $25,348 to $35,001, and raising the first 
repayment rate from 3 percent to 4 percent. Over subsequent years, the first threshold has 
been increased to approximately keep pace with average earnings, and was $41,595 in 
2008-09. In combination, these changes mean that the discontinuity at the first repayment 
threshold is now considerably higher than in the period that we analyse (1 July 2001 to 30 
June 2004). At the same time, assuming that the income distribution in Figure 3 shifted 
rightwards by several thousand dollars over a five-year period, then that would suggest 
that there are probably fewer individuals with a HECS debt who have incomes around the 
first threshold.  
 
Since these two factors (a sharper discontinuity, but a higher threshold) most likely work 
in opposite directions, it is difficult to be confident about the overall effects of the new 
discontinuity. However, even if the policy changes have increased the effect of the HECS 
discontinuity, the consequences are unlikely to be large in economic terms. Even 
assuming that the behavioural effects in recent years are twice as large as those that we 
have estimated for 2001-2004 (a very strong assumption), the resulting economic burden 
remains negligible. 
 
For designers of income-contingent loans, our results suggest that a sharp discontinuity in 
the repayment threshold is not likely to be a substantial problem, and that the equity gains 
from such a design most likely outweigh any efficiency costs.
14 Our results also have 
                                                       
14 For example, when considering reforms to income-contingent loans in the United 
Kingdom, a parliamentary committee recommended that the repayment threshold be raised to 
the level of average earnings (then £24,500) (Education and Skills Committee 2003). The 
UK Government’s response was that this was not feasible, since ‘doing so would both 
increase the overall cost of loans and the time over which graduates would repay them’ 
(Secretary of State for Education and Skills 2003). Neither side appeared to acknowledge  
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implications for taxpayer behaviour in generic terms in that they reinforce earlier findings 
which have found very little bunching around kink points (Saez 2008). It is worth 
highlighting that the effect of the HECS repayment threshold is to create an extremely 
high effective marginal tax rate – perhaps the highest tax rate experienced anywhere in 
the world. Given that this sharp discontinuity does not induce a substantial degree of 
bunching, it should come as little surprise that there is minimal bunching at kink points in 








another option – that the threshold could be raised to average earnings, but with repayments 
based on total income (rather than income above the threshold, as in the current system). Our 
results from Australia, upon which the UK income-contingent loans scheme has been 
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Appendix I: A Numerical Example of the HECS Repayment Decision 
 
The assumptions used for our illustration are based very approximately on the 2003-04 
tuition arrangements for HECS (and chosen to simplify the numerical calculations). They 
are as follows: 
 




b)  The debt has a real interest rate of zero, meaning that the nominal level of the debt 
is increased every year by the CPI; 
 
c)  The graduate is able to avoid having a taxable income above the income threshold 
of repayment for one year only;
16 
 
d)  The graduate expects to receive $25,348 in real terms per annum for the next 
seven years;  
 
e)  The graduate is obligated to repay 3 percent of $25,348 ($760) towards her HECS 
debt. Only in the first year can she potentially avoid this repayment. If she does 
so, the avoided HECS repayment is effectively then transferred to the seventh 
year;  and 
 
f)  The graduate has a (real) discount rate of 5 percent per year. 
 
                                                       
15  This would be a typical debt for a former student with a three-year degree who had 
paid for one year of tuition up-front (thus not incurring a HECS debt for this year). While 
many students would have higher debts than this, the example is illustrative. 
16 This assumption seems reasonable, since it is well known that university graduates 
experience relatively steep age-earnings profiles during their initial decade in the labour 
force.  
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To illustrate the consequences for the avoidance of repayment of the HECS debt for 
effective marginal tax rate, the present value of repayments (calculated at the point of 
graduation) for two scenarios can be compared. The first calculation involves the debtor 
not engaging in behaviour to avoid the repayment of her debt in the first period after 
graduation. In this case, the present value of the stream of repayments (V) is given by the 
addition of the discounted costs of the debt from years 1 to 6 after graduation: 
 
V(1) = 760 + 760/(1.05) + … + 760/(1.05)
5     ( A 1 )  
                  = $4050 
 
The second calculation involves the debtor engaging in behaviour that results in her 
decreasing her taxable income in the first period from $25,348 per annum to $25,347 per 
annum, which means that she then has no HECS repayment obligations in the first period, 
and accordingly a (highly discounted) additional HECS repayment in the seventh period 
after graduation. The present value of her HECS repayment obligations are thus given by 
the sum of the discounted costs of the debt from years 2 to 7 after graduation: 
 
V(2) = 0 + 760/(1.05) + … + 760/(1.05)
6       (A2) 
          = $3857 
 
The difference in the present value of the streams is $193, which means that the 
additional dollar earned for scenario (1) has the present value costs of $193, or an 
effective marginal tax rate of 19,300 percent, which is very significantly higher than any 
other effective marginal tax rate calculations for other combinations of tax and welfare 
policies. It should be noted that the example assumes a particularly unusual case – in 
which the taxpayer’s taxable income is precisely at the HECS repayment threshold. It 
should also be acknowledged that the calculation has been done using a change in income 
of only $1, and this explains in part the large size of the illustration (an odd feature of the 
discontinuity is that incrementing income by $0.01 or $100 would give a result that was 
100 times larger or smaller than incrementing income by $1).  
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Appendix II: A Formal Model of the HECS Repayment Decision 
 
What now follows is the modelling of the benefits and costs relevant to the individual’s 
decision to avoid the repayment of HECS. It is further assumed that if the taxpayer 
avoids, this occurs only for one year, being the year in which the debtor initially would 
have crossed the first income threshold of repayment if he or she had not chosen to avoid.  
 
Non-repayment of HECS for the period has a benefit and a cost. The benefit is that in the 
current period the debtor is able to transfer the obligation to the future, and it exists 
because there is no real rate of interest on the debt and people have positive real discount 
rates. This benefit can be expressed as the present value of the difference between what 
the debtor would pay without avoidance and what the debtor would pay given avoidance. 
Symbolically, let Ni equal the present value of the cost of the non-avoidance of 
repayment by taxpayer i in period t and let Ei equal the present value of the cost of 
repayment of HECS given the avoidance of payment in period 1. The benefit is thus: 
 
Nit - Eit         ( A 3 )  
 
It is useful to break this down further, into the payment avoided in the first period (we 
will call this Ai1) and the discounted value of the deferred payment once it is eventually 
made (we will call this Pit).  
 
The value of the payment avoided in the first period is the product of the repayment rate r 
and taxable income before the avoidance strategy is used, T. We assume that T is a 
function of a vector of inherent characteristics Z (encompassing factors such as 
experience, education and ability) and an error term ε. 
 
Ai1 = rT(Zi,εi1)          ( A 4 )  
 
In the example above, the taxpayer’s income before avoidance was precisely the 
repayment threshold. Using the parameters for the tax year 2003-04, we found that  
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Ai1 = $25,348×0.03 = $760. Here we take account of the possibility that the taxpayer’s 
income is above the repayment threshold. This will increase both the benefits and costs of 
avoiding. 
 
A way to consider Pit is that it is a payment to be made eventually, the benefit to the 
debtor being that in period 1 the future obligation has the value of being discounted. 
Thus, where d is the personal rate of discount (which varies across individuals, but not 
across time), and n is the number of years it takes for the postponed debt to be paid: 
 
Pit = A1t/ (1 + di)
n        ( A 5 )  
 
The benefit of repayment avoidance is thus given by: 
 
Ai1 – Pit        ( A 6 )  
 
In the example set out above, d = 0.05, n = 6, A1 = 760 and consequently Pit = $567. Thus 
the benefit of avoidance (Ai1 – Pit) was $760-$567=$193. 
 
Avoiding also has a cost. This takes the form of the debtor needing to find a mechanism 
or mechanisms to reduce taxable income below the threshold once it is expected that 
income would reach the threshold. There are several ways in which this might be done. 
The taxpayer might reduce his or her labour supply, hire an accountant to find additional 
deductions or purchase deductible items.
17 For simplicity, these costs are assumed to be 
                                                       
17 We assume that the cost of avoidance is net of income tax savings. For example, 
suppose an individual’s pre-tax income is $1000 above the threshold, the individual must 
pay an accountant $500 to reduce their tax liability by that amount and the regular 
income tax rate in this range is 30 percent. If the individual did not avoid, they would 
receive $700 more than the threshold ($1000 minus $300 in regular income taxes). By 
avoiding, the individual must pay the accountant $500, but he or she also saves $300 in 
income taxes. So the net cost of avoiding is $200. Thus a=200/1000=0.2. In the 
numerical example given here, the taxpayer’s pre-avoidance taxable income was 
precisely the repayment threshold amount, so the amount of income tax saved was zero.  
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proportional to the reduction in taxable income.
18 We term the cost of avoidance a, and 
assume that it lies between 0 and 1, and is constant across taxpayers and over time. 
 
We assume that the taxpayer’s income exceeds R, the HECS repayment threshold in year 
t. Where T>R, we can model C, the total cost of avoidance, as:  
 
Cit = a[T(Zit,εit) – Rt]           ( A 7 )  
 
With expressions for both the benefits and costs we are now able to show the conditions 
under which a debtor will choose to avoid.  
 
Generally, repayment avoidance will occur when: 
 
Ait – Pit – Cit  >   0         ( A 8 )  
 
Substituting from equations (2), (3) and (5), a taxpayer will avoid if: 
 
rTit – rTit/(1 + di)
n – a(Tit – Rt)  >  0      (A9) 
 
Thus, avoidance can be shown to be more likely the higher is r (since the benefit is higher 
for any given T, given that r>r/(1+d)
n), the higher is d (since as d increases the less 
negative r/(1+d)
n becomes), the higher is n (since this lowers the present value of the 
deferred repayment), the lower is the per-dollar avoidance cost a and the higher is R 
(since aR is always positive). The effect of T on avoidance is in principle ambiguous: if 
a>r-r/(1+d)
n then avoidance will be more likely the lower is T, while if a<r-r/(1+d)
n then 
                                                       
18 One could imagine situations in which the avoidance costs are a decreasing or 
increasing function of the reduction in taxable income. For example, if avoidance occurs 
through paying an accountant’s fees, which has some fixed component, then there may be 
a decreasing relationship between a and T-R. Alternatively, if avoidance occurs through 
behaving illegally, and the probability of detection rises with the magnitude of the 
offence, then there may be an increasing relationship between a and T-R.  
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avoidance will be more likely the higher is T. In practice, we expect the former to hold in 
almost all cases, and thus avoidance to fall as T rises. 
 
Some of these parameters are not observable in the available taxation data, but the 
essence of the theoretical model can be tested in the empirical analysis.  
 
The budgetary cost of bunching 
 
In estimating the budgetary cost of bunching, we use the same parameters.  Additionally, 
we use τ to denote the income tax rate in the area of the repayment threshold, and g to 
denote the real rate of interest earned by the government. For simplicity, suppose that 
each person who bunches reduces their income to epsilon below the repayment threshold. 
The cost to the budget from each person who bunches (B) is therefore the sum of the lost 
tax revenue and the deferral of the taxpayer’s HECS debt.  
 
B = τ(T-R) + rT(1-(1+g)
-n)       (A10) 
 